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Abstract 
This paper is the first study on the effects of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) on the 
performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the presence of social ties and family ties of the 
top managers with board members. We find that both social ties and family ties increase PPS. In 
turn, PPS improves IPO performance. More importantly, greater PPS increases the positive 
effect of social ties on IPO performance whereas it reduces the negative effect of family ties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The initial public offering (IPO) is a major transition in the life of the firm (Welbourne and 
Andrews, 1996) as it results in a separation of ownership and control, and hence a reduction in 
the incentives of the top management team (TMT) to work hard and expend the required effort to 
pursue the best interest of the shareholders. Pay-for-performance schemes, monitored by 
independent board members, may thus be one way to ensure, via increased pay-performance 
sensitivity (PPS), the alignment of interests between the TMT and the shareholders.  
However, IPO firms tend to suffer from a major disadvantage when compared to more mature 
firms. As they are young firms they are less likely to attract independent board members with 
sufficient experience and expertise to perform effectively their service tasks. IPO firms are 
therefore more likely to rely on friends and families of the TMT to serve on the board of 
directors. The potential advantage of having friends and family on the board is the smoother 
interaction between the TMT and the board, which stems from the similarities in experiences and 
points of view between the two, brought about by homophily. McPherson et al. (2001, p. 416) 
define homophily as “the principle that a contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate 
than among dissimilar people”. In other words, one’s friends and family are likely to be similar 
to one-self, ensuring smoother social dealings. This also suggests that PPS for the TMT is likely 
to be higher in the presence of social ties and family ties, reflecting the greater alignment of 
interests between the former and the board of directors. However, the positive effect of pay-for-
performance schemes may be reduced due to the board’s lower monitoring efficiency caused by 
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the social ties or family ties between top managers and board members. As such ties might 
reduce the effectiveness of the board of directors as a monitoring device, they might also result 
in lower firm performance. Put differently, the carrot (pay for performance) might have less of a 
positive effect if there is less of a stick (monitoring by the board). 
The contributions of this paper to the literature are three-fold. First and most importantly, this is 
the first paper – to the best of our knowledge – to examine the effects on pay-performance 
sensitivity (PPS) of social ties and family ties of the top managers with board members for the 
case of IPO firms. Using a unique dataset of observations on 3,613 TMT members in 500 IPO 
firms from 1997 to 2008, we measure family ties as the number of board members with whom a 
given TMT member has a family tie, expressed as a proportion of the total board size. Social ties 
are of the following four types: same origin (i.e., the same foreign nationality), same school (i.e., 
educational institution), same former employer, and same club or association membership. 
Similar to family ties, we measure the number of board members with whom the TMT member 
has at least one social tie, expressed as a proportion of the total board size. PPS is measured by 
taking into account all stock options as well as all shares owned by the TMT member 
immediately after the IPO. It measures the dollar change in the TMT member’s compensation 
caused by a one-dollar change in the stock price. We find that both family ties and social ties 
increase PPS. More generally, our results indicate the conditions under which PPS alleviates 
possible conflicts of interests arising from the existence of family ties and social ties between 
executives and board members. 
Second, this paper not only examines PPS in the context of social ties and family ties within IPO 
firms, but does so for the entire TMT rather than just for the CEO as this is typically the case in 
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the existing literature. Hence, it tests in a more holistic manner the validity of the managerial 
power theory, which is based on the premise that board structure is an important determinant of 
the effectiveness of board monitoring and of the alignment of executive pay with firm 
performance.  
Third and in line with previous research by the authors (see Chahine and Goergen, 2013), social 
ties reduce IPO underpricing whereas family ties have the opposite effect. In terms of the other 
performance measures, social ties increase the IPO premium as well as the long-term buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. In contrast, family ties have a negative effect on these alternative 
performance measures. Conversely, Hwang and Kim (2009) find that social ties destroy rather 
create value for the case of mature firms. More importantly, the present paper proposes a way 
forward whereby firm owners can mitigate the value destroying effect of family ties or reinforce 
the value creating effects of social ties. Indeed, greater PPS is a way to ensure the agents act in 
the interest of the principal. We find that the negative effect of family ties on IPO performance is 
largely cancelled out by greater PPS whereas the already positive effect of social ties is increased 
by greater PPS. Our evidence contrasts with Aggarwal and Samwick (2006), who do not find 
that PPS mitigates private benefits of control but rather mitigates private costs of investing. 
Indeed, our study finds that PPS helps reduce possible private benefits of control in family 
firms.1  
In the next section, we review the literature and develop the conjectures. We then discuss the 
data and methodology. This is followed by the analysis of the empirical results. We then run 
robustness checks, and we draw conclusions in the final section.  
                                                          
1
 Conversely, Kau et al. (2008) find that CEOs with greater PPS are more likely to listen to the market by reversing 
investment decisions once the market has reacted negatively to their announcement. 
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND CONJECTURES 
The Effect on PPS of Family Ties and Social Ties of the TMT with Board Members 
The role of the board of directors is to monitor the firm’s managers in order to mitigate the 
agency conflicts that result from the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Nonetheless, the role of the board typically goes beyond protecting shareholder interests 
as it extends to participation in the firm’s strategic decision making as well as the setup of TMT 
pay-for-performance incentives (Dalton et al., 1998; and Golden and Zajac, 2001).  
Hwang and Kim (2009) examine the Fortune 100 firms, and hypothesize that social ties affect 
the ways directors monitor and discipline the CEO. They observe that a considerable percentage 
of boards currently classified as independent from the TMT are not so in practice. They adjust 
conventional board independence for social ties and study its impact on TMT compensation. 
They find that PPS is significantly lower and pay levels are significantly higher for CEOs of 
firms with boards that are socially dependent on the CEO. Therefore, social ties might be an 
advantage to the CEO, as well as the other TMT members, when negotiating their compensation 
with the board (Hwang and Kim, 2009). However, compared to mature firms, IPO firms face 
more uncertainty than mature firms, and principals are therefore less likely to have a strong sense 
of what actions an agent could and should be pursuing. Pay-for-performance incentives are thus 
likely to ensure that managers pursue shareholder interests (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Such 
incentives include stock options, which are a relatively cost-effective and straightforward means 
of aligning the TMT’s incentives with those of the owners, as well as stock ownership. 
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In contrast, TMT members with family ties are likely to have a significant fraction of their 
wealth, via stock ownership, closely tied to the value of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Schulze et al., 2003). As such, their pay – or more precisely the income they derive from their 
firm – is highly performance sensitive, thereby aligning their interests with those of the other 
owners. Put differently, TMT members with family ties are likely to have high PPS given their 
stock ownership. We arrive at the following conjecture. 
C1: Pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is higher for TMT members with family ties or social ties 
with board members than for those without any such ties. 
PPS and IPO Performance 
Engel et al. (2002) point out that governance issues, such as the CEO’s incentives, are critical for 
firms going public and about to establish a formal separation between ownership and control. 
Since outside investors do not have any prior experience of the IPO firm, the IPO process is 
usually characterized by high levels of uncertainty and asymmetric information. While some 
studies suggest that higher PPS can exacerbate managerial risk aversion, leading to suboptimal 
risk-taking (see e.g. Lambert et al., 1993), there is relatively consistent evidence that PPS, on 
average, provides increased risk-taking incentives (see e.g. Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002: Coles et 
al., 2006). Executive compensation schemes may thus be important in terms of aligning the 
interests of the executives with those of the shareholders. Stock options and stock ownership are 
means of making executive pay more sensitive to firm performance. In particular, a high degree 
of PPS ensures that insiders are well incentivized. More specifically, Certo et al. (2003) find that 
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stock options have a positive effect on IPO valuation, whereas Jain and Kini (1994) find a 
positive effect of post-IPO insider stock ownership on firm performance.   
C2: IPO performance increases with pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) for the TMT member. 
The Effect on IPO Performance and PPS of Family Ties and Social Ties of the TMT 
Members with Board Members  
In what follows, we argue − similar to previous work by the authors (see Chahine and Goergen, 
2013) − that family ties reduce IPO performance whereas social ties have the opposite effect. 
What is novel in the present study is that we argue that PPS reduces the negative effect of family 
ties and amplifies the positive effect of social ties on IPO performance. In detail, prior literature 
suggests that family ties provide firms with valuable resources which are likely to be a long-term 
source of competitive advantage (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Broadly speaking, family ties may 
increase cooperation, including altruism, and individual and firm performance. To the extent that 
firms with stronger family ties between the TMT and board members are more likely to be 
family firms, these firms are also less likely to suffer from agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control. Indeed, for firms with strong family ties the moral hazard 
problem may be significantly mitigated because (1) the large shareholdings of the family 
alleviate the free rider problem inherent in firms with numerous atomistic investors (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985), (2) there exists less information asymmetry between the TMT and the board 
directors, thereby facilitating better monitoring by the board and the provision of better advice to 
the managers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), and (3) family-run firms have longer investment 
horizons, thus attenuating stock market short-termism (e.g. Stein, 1989).  
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However in turn, family firms may be subject to conflicts of interests between controlling and 
non-controlling shareholders (e.g., Ali et al., 2007). Indeed, Cabrera-Suárez et al. (2001) argue 
that family culture, influenced by the history of the family, may make an organization inflexible 
and resistant to change (see also Hall et al., 2001). Family ties may, for example, lead to 
paternalism, whereby family members care excessively for the other employees of the firm, 
interfere with their decisions, and “protect” them while denying them responsibility and the 
freedom to make autonomous choices (Dyer, 1986). Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the 
involvement in the management of family members, other than the founding CEO, has a negative 
effect on firm performance. Family ties may thus have negative consequences such as 
shareholder value destruction. In addition, founding families may enjoy considerable control and 
power due to their concentrated shareholdings in their firms, which in turn may facilitate the 
expropriation of minority shareholders and lead to poor performance (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). 
One can even argue that the danger of minority shareholders being expropriated by the 
controlling family is greater at the time of the IPO since outside investors have very limited 
knowledge about the firm at that time. In other words, while recent evidence suggests that family 
ownership and management has a positive impact on performance (McConaughy, 2000; Schulze 
et al., 2003), family bonds are likely to create incentives to behave opportunistically, and to 
cause moral hazard, including free riding and shirking (Lubatkin et al., 2005). The increase in 
TMT “familiness” within the upper echelon potentially enhances the misappropriation of the 
firm’s resources by family top executives (Schulze et al., 2001; Minichilli et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, greater PPS might reduce part of the negative effects of family ties on IPO 
performance. Put differently, the positive effect of PPS on IPO performance is likely to be lower 
in the presence of family ties.  
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C3: While IPO performance is negatively affected by family ties, this effect is mitigated by 
greater PPS. 
Similar arguments may be made for the case of social ties. Indeed, boards influence firm 
performance and protect shareholder interests by monitoring and disciplining TMT members 
(Boyd, 1994; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Westphal and Zajac, 1995). In particular, outside 
directors, provided they are independent from the firm, monitor managers’ decision making to 
ensure the maximization of shareholder wealth (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Hence, the absence 
of social ties makes the board’s monitoring more effective (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 315), 
whereas their existence might create barriers to monitoring which affect the quality of board 
performance (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994). This argument is supported by empirical evidence 
suggesting that social ties have a negative effect on TMT oversight (Hirsch et al., 1987).  
In contrast, Westphal (1999) argues that social ties, such as friendships, encourage CEOs as well 
as other top managers to seek advice from the board. Evidence from behavioral research suggests 
how social ties among colleagues foster advice seeking, decrease the fear of compromising one’s 
social status and of disclosing information. In addition, Westphal (1999) cites research which 
shows that friendships enhance communication, information sharing, and collaboration through 
trust, and that they do not hinder the board’s monitoring and oversight of the CEO. As such, 
social ties with similar others, influence firm performance since people with similar experiences 
enjoy smoother interaction (McPherson et al., 2001). In other words, social ties facilitate mutual 
understanding and render communication more likely and comfortable (Marsden, 1987; 
McPherson et al., 2001). In particular, social dependence shifts normative expectations from 
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exchange-based norms that promote “dispassionate reciprocation” to communal norms that 
promote care and trust (Clark and Mills, 1979; Silver, 1990).  
There is evidence that social ties create a positive predisposition and mitigate competitive 
behavior, thus directly affecting measurable economic outcomes (Hwang and Kim, 2009). 
Accordingly, these shared qualities and experiences, through the ties with similar others within 
the firm, facilitate interactions and thereby foster personal connections. Whether this is conscious 
or not, those concerned enjoy a higher degree of mutual understanding and are more comfortable 
with others who have similar characteristics and experiences (Marsden, 1987; McPherson et al., 
2001). Prior research in the area of leader-member exchange theory, which focuses on the two-
way relationship between supervisors and subordinates, shows that social ties between superiors 
and subordinates yield better performance (Bauer and Green, 1996). A management-friendly 
board may thus be optimal for shareholders (Westphal, 1999; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Almazan and Suarez, 2003) given the positive effect of social ties on firm performance 
(Westphal, 1999).2  
In addition to social ties, the choice of adequate incentive schemes is likely to establish a 
consensus and improve collaboration between the boardroom and the TMT, which in turn 
improves firm performance. We argue that IPO firms with TMT members with social ties with 
board members have a shared purpose and consensus vision and are thus likely to implement 
sufficiently articulated strategies to generate better IPO performance. Therefore, the positive 
                                                          
2
 Westphal (1999) finds that the board’s monitoring of the CEO, as well as the exchange of information between the 
CEO and the board, has a positive effect on firm performance as measured by the market-to-book ratio and the 
return on equity. 
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effects of PPS on IPO performance are likely to be greater in the presence of social ties as 
compared to the presence of family ties. 
C4: IPO performance is positively affected by social ties, and this effect is amplified by greater 
PPS. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data Sources 
We start with the list of all IPOs in the US markets from 1997 to 2008, obtained from the 
Securities Data Company (SDC) database. In line with prior research on IPOs (see e.g. Loughran 
and Ritter, 2002), we eliminate real-estate investment trusts (REITs), American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, foreign IPOs, unit offerings, financial IPOs, and those with 
an offer price of less than five dollars. We also eliminate carve-outs and spin-offs as these are 
different from regular IPOs given that they are flotations of parts of mature businesses (see e.g. 
Chahine and Goergen, 2011). We end up with 2,082 IPOs. To keep within limits the highly 
labor-intensive data collection, we then randomly select 500 of these IPOs for our final sample, 
which represents about 20% of the IPO population. The TMT consists of those individuals listed 
in the IPO prospectus as top managers, i.e. those with executive level titles (i.e. vice-president 
and above). 
The data on family ties, social ties, stock options, stock ownership, fixed salary, bonus and IPO 
characteristics is collected from the IPO prospectuses. The board’s composition is also collected 
from the IPO prospectuses, by consulting the sections on the “MANAGEMENT” and 
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“PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS” as well as the footnotes to these sections to ensure the data is 
as accurate as possible. An additional data source is the proxy statements for the fiscal year of 
the IPO, which are available from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Electronic 
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR). In addition to the data on IPO stock 
options which are usually issued on (or a few days before) the offering date, data is also collected 
on all stock options granted prior to the IPO period as well as stock ownership. This enables us 
to determine overall PPS for the TMT members in place immediately after the IPO. 
Table 1 compares the random sample of 500 IPOs covered by this study to the population of the 
2,082 IPOs. Panel A shows that, although some years are over-represented in the sample, the 
sample roughly follows the peaks and troughs of the population. Panel B suggests that the 
distribution across industries is similar to the population. Finally, Panel C shows that the sample 
and population have similar market capitalizations, percentages of hi-tech firms, percentages of 
VC-backed firms and similar first-day underpricing. Hence, we are confident that our sample is 
representative of the population of IPOs. 
[Table 1 About Here] 
Methodology 
To examine 1) the impact of family ties and social ties on PPS and 2) the impact of PPS as well 
as family ties and social ties for individual TMT members on IPO performance, we estimate the 
following system of two equations: 
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Pay-Performance Sensitivityi,j = α0 + α1 × Family Tiesi,j + α2 × Social Tiesi,j 
    + α3 × control variablesi + εi     (1) 
IPO Performancei    = β0 + β1 × Family Tiesi,j + β2 × Social Tiesi,j  
    + β3 × Pay-Performance Sensitivityi,j  
    + β4 × Family Tiesi,j × Pay-Performance Sensitivityi,j  
    + β5 × Social Tiesi,j × Pay-Performance Sensitivityi,j 
    + β6 × control variablesi + ηi     (2) 
Equation (1) tests the validity of Conjecture 1 whereas equation (2) tests the validity of 
Conjectures 2, 3 and 4. We first estimate the regressions at the level of the individual TMT 
member (represented by index j in the above two equations) for each IPO firm (represented by 
index i). All the regressions control for firm fixed effects as the observations for the individual 
TMT members of the same firm are not independent of each other. This is done by clustering the 
regression errors by IPO firms. Later, in the robustness section, we re-estimate the regressions at 
the IPO firm level by aggregating the social ties and family ties of individual TMT members. In 
that section, we also re-estimate the regressions at the CEO level only.  
Since family ties and social ties are likely to affect both PPS and IPO performance, and PPS is 
hypothesized to affect IPO performance, our empirical results might be affected by the 
endogeneity of PPS. There is thus a need to control for the potentially endogenous determination 
of PPS. The Hausman (1978) specification test confirms the endogeneity of PPS at the 1% 
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significance level. We shall thus use 3-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions, which are more 
efficient and are based on the full information set compared to the 2-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure, which uses less information about the error structure. In a first instance, 
we do so by using the TMT member’s board membership as an instrumental variable. Board 
Member dummy is set to one if the TMT member holds a board seat, and is zero otherwise. The 
Appendix discusses the validity of this instrument in detail. Further, for the CEO regressions in 
the robustness section we need to use different instruments as all CEOs sit on the board. In that 
same section, we also use a different way of adjusting for the potential endogeneity of PPS. In 
addition, in that section, we also adjust for the possible endogeneity of social ties and family ties 
in two different ways. Below, we present our dependent variables and the independent variables. 
Dependent Variables 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS) is determined for every TMT member. It takes into account 
both stock options, granted at the time of IPO or during the years preceding the IPO, and stock 
ownership. It is calculated using the Black-Scholes model and is equal to delta times the shares 
represented by the option awards divided by the total number of shares outstanding immediately 
following the IPO. Delta is the change in the Black-Scholes option value caused by a one-dollar 
change in the stock price. Delta provides an estimate of the change in the value of the stock-
option awards for a one-dollar change in the value of the firm’s common equity (Yermack, 
1995).3 We then add to that figure the number of shares owned by the TMT member divided by 
                                                          
3
 We make the following assumptions. We use the offer price as the price of the underlying stock at the time of the 
awards. For the exercise price, we use the weighted average of the exercise price of all stock options held by the 
TMT member at the IPO. We then use the yield of the ten-year U.S. Treasury Bond whose maturity coincides with 
the life time of the options. We calculate the annualized volatility, defined as the square root of the sample variance 
of the daily logarithmic stock returns during the first 120 trading days following the closing of the first day of 
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the total number of shares outstanding, both being measured immediately following the IPO. 
Hence, PPS measures the change in the TMT member’s compensation, via his stock options and 
stock ownership, caused by a one-dollar change in the stock price.4 In the robustness section, we 
rerun the regressions for the CEOs only. This enables us to include the bonus into the calculation 
of PPS and to control for the fixed salary, two data items that are frequently not disclosed for the 
other TMT members. 
IPO Performance is measured in the short run by first-day underpricing and the IPO premium, 
and in the long run by the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over the one-year, two-year 
and three-year period following the close of the first day of trading. In line with prior literature, 
Underpricing is the difference between the price at the end of the first day of trading and the 
offer price over the offer price. IPO Premium is the difference between the offer price and the 
book value per share expressed as a fraction of the offer price (Nelson, 2003). BHAR 1Y, BHAR 
2Y and BHAR 3Y is the one-year period, the two-year period and the three-year period (starting 
with the close of the market on the first day of trading) aftermarket performance, respectively. 
All three are adjusted by the equally-weighted return of 5x5 benchmark portfolios based on 
market capitalization and book-to-market ratio.5 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trading, multiplied by 254, the number of trading days in a typical year. The dividend rate effect is excluded from 
the model since none of our firms pays a dividend around its IPO. 
4
 In an earlier version of the paper, PPS was based on stock options only. The regression results were qualitatively 
similar. 
5
 We identify for each IPO firm a portfolio of stocks based on market capitalization and another one based on the 
book-to-market ratio. The benchmark portfolios are built at the end of each IPO trading date as part of the 
intersections of 5 portfolios based on size (market capitalization) and 5 portfolios based on the book-to market ratio 
(B/M). The size breakpoints for each IPO are the quintiles of all Compustat firms for which we have market equity 
data on the IPO date. The B/M breakpoints are the quintiles of the B/M of all Compustat firms with a positive book 
equity value on the last fiscal year end in t-1. The B/M is equal to the book equity divided by the market 
capitalization for the last fiscal year end in t-1.   
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Independent Variables 
Family Ties and Social Ties are TMT-member level variables. Family Ties is defined as the 
number of board members with whom a given TMT member has a family tie, expressed as a 
proportion of the total board size. Social Ties is the number of board members with whom the 
TMT member has at least one social tie, expressed as a proportion of the total board size. Social 
ties are of the following types: same origin (i.e., the same foreign nationality), same school (i.e., 
educational institution), same former employer, and same club or association membership. 
Moreover, for a TMT member who has both family ties and social ties with the same board 
member, we class such a TMT member as having family ties.6 The rationale for doing so is that 
family ties are based on blood connections which provide a “binding” type of social capital 
whereas social ties are based on friendship and therefore provide only a “bridging” type of social 
capital. Compared to social ties, “family ties are personal and involve relatives, self-experiences 
and a sense of self-identity” (Trevinyo-Rodriguez and Bontis, 2010, p. 421). Hence, the family 
represents “a strong tie, developed on the basis of trust, expectation and the family bond” (Jack, 
2005, p. 1244). As such, family ties usually give a personal dimension of shared responsibility 
for the firm, generating a sense of belonging as well as intense emotions among family members. 
These emotions may influence the perceptions of family members, bind them together, keep 
them apart from others, and regulate “their behavior through guilt, shame and pride” (Massey, 
2002, p. 20). Since family ties are more binding and thus more influential than social ties, we 
                                                          
6
 Prior research on mergers and acquisitions examines the case where one acquirer director and one target director 
serve on the same third-party board (the so-called “second-degree” board connectedness), and shows that this form 
of social tie increases acquirer returns (see e.g. Cai and Sevilir, 2012). We are not aware of any case of second-
degree board connectedness for our sample. 
17 
 
assume that their effect dominates the effect of social ties with the same board member. We 
check the validity of this assumption in the robustness section.  
Based on prior research (see e.g. Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002), we argue that IPO 
performance mainly depends on firm characteristics and market conditions at the time of the 
IPO. Both equations (1) and (2) control for firm size and industry. Market Capitalization, based 
on the offer price, is used as a proxy for firm size. We use the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization Ln Size, in the regressions and this is expected to increase compensation (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990), and IPO performance (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). A Hi-Tech dummy is added 
to control for the presence of higher asymmetric information in high-technology firms. This 
dummy variable is equal to one if the IPO firm is a hi-tech firm, and zero otherwise.7 In line with 
prior research by Ritter (1984), Aftermarket Standard Deviation is used as a proxy for the 
riskiness of the IPO firm. It is equal to the standard deviation of the stock returns over the first 
100 days starting with the first trading day following the IPO day. In line with Yermack (1995), 
we control for tax loss carry-forwards since firms with tax loss carry-forwards have lower 
marginal tax rates, making stock options more attractive. These firms are also riskier, which may 
affect IPO performance. Loss Carry-forward dummy is equal to one for firms with a tax loss 
carry-forward, and zero otherwise. Jensen (1986) argues that leverage plays a monitoring role. It 
may thus substitute for low PPS and improve IPO performance. Hence, both equations control 
for leverage by including Pre-IPO Leverage which is equal to pre-IPO long-term debt expressed 
as a fraction of pre-IPO total assets, both measured in the year preceding the IPO date (Leone et 
                                                          
7
 In line with Loughran and Ritter (2004), hi-tech stocks are defined as those with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 
3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and controlling 
devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 (communication services), and 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379 (software). 
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al., 2007). We also control for the growth opportunities of the IPO firm, via the price-to-book 
ratio, as these are likely to affect the compensation scheme as well as IPO performance. Since 
the IPO premium is based on the offer price and the book value per share, the Price-to-Book 
Ratio is included in the regressions on all measures of IPO performance, except for the 
regression on the IPO premium (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Lock-up Period is equal to the 
difference in days between the IPO date and the lock-up expiry date. We expect a longer lock-up 
period to signal the commitment of the pre-IPO owners to the firm and therefore to affect IPO 
performance positively (Brav and Gompers, 2003; Megginson and Weiss, 1991). Social Board 
Independence is the proportion of outside directors with neither family ties nor social ties with 
the TMT members and also without financial ties with the latter as well as the IPO firm.  
The regressions also include a VC dummy which is equal to one if the IPO firm is VC-backed, 
and zero otherwise (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Hamao et al., 2000; Lowry 
and Murphy, 2007). We also control for the reputation of the underwriter managing the offering. 
Underwriter Reputation is calculated as in Carter and Manaster (1990) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), with more reputable underwriters expected to certify the quality of managed offerings 
and to increase IPO performance. Market Return is the compound return of the equally-weighted 
CRSP index over the 20 trading days preceding the IPO date. It controls for market momentum 
and is expected to increase underpricing (Hanley, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 2002). All the 
regressions include year dummies to control for cycles in IPO activity.8 
The underpricing regression, which is based on equation (2), controls for an additional variable 
commonly used in the IPO literature, namely price revision. Price Revision is equal to the ratio 
                                                          
8
 The previous version of the paper included a Bubble Period dummy, instead of the year dummies. It controlled for 
the internet bubble of 1999-2000. Our results were qualitatively similar with this dummy. 
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of the difference between the offer price and the mid-point of the initial price range to the latter, 
and is used as a proxy for investor feedback during the pre-IPO period (Hanley, 1993).9  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 500 IPOs forming our sample. The average 
market capitalization is $455.4 million. The average aftermarket standard deviation of daily 
stock returns over the 100 days following the IPO (excluding the first day return) is 2.3%. On 
average, pre-IPO leverage is 25.6%, the price-to-book ratio is just under 2.7 and the lock-up 
period is 160 days. On average only 28.5% of board members are socially independent as 
evidenced by the absence of social, financial and family ties with the TMT members and the 
firm. Around 36.4% of the sample firms belong to hi-tech industries, 62.0% are VC-backed, and 
35.2% went public during the bubble period of 1999-2000. The average market return preceding 
the IPO is 1.4%. On average, underwriter’s reputation is equal to 7.345 within the Loughran and 
Ritter (2004) ranking.  
The average price revision is positive with 3.6% and underpricing is 29.1%. The average 
premium amounts to 73.4% and the long-run aftermarket abnormal performance averages -2.4% 
over the one-year period, -14.2% over the two-year period and -5.9% over the three-year period 
following the IPO. Finally, there are on average 7.236 TMT members per IPO firm. 
[Table 2 About Here] 
                                                          
9
 Although not shown in the paper, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all the variables. All VIFs 
are below 1.43, which suggests that our data does not suffer from severe multicollinearity (O’Brien, 2007). 
20 
 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the 3,613 TMT members in the 500 IPOs covered by this 
study. In a first instance, it compares the 2,124 TMT members without any ties with the 1,489 
TMT members with ties, whether family ties or social ties. In a second instance, it compares the 
169 TMT members with family ties with the 1,320 TMT members with social ties. The table 
suggests that, while family ties are a relatively rare occurrence, they tend to be stronger than 
social ties. Indeed, the average TMT member with family ties has such ties with 38% of the 
board members. In contrast, social ties are a frequent occurrence but they involve only 25% of 
board members.  
The table also shows that the proportion of TMT members that have stock options is 
significantly lower for those without ties (0.347) than for those with ties (0.572) (p=1%). TMT 
members without ties also hold on average significantly fewer stock options as well as stock 
options with a lower value than TMT members with ties (p=1%). Moreover, the proportion of 
TMT members with stock options is significantly higher for those with social ties (0.580) than 
for those with family ties (0.509) (p=10%). TMT members with social ties also hold 
significantly more stock options as well as stock options with a higher value compared to TMT 
members with family ties (p=1%).  
[Table 3 About Here] 
There are also significant differences in terms of stock ownership. Compared to TMT members 
with ties, TMT members without ties are significantly less likely to have stock ownership and 
have significantly less post-IPO ownership (p=1%). TMT members with family ties are more 
likely to have stock ownership and have more post-IPO ownership (p=1%) than those with social 
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ties. As a consequence of these differences in stock option ownership as well as stock ownership, 
PPS of TMT members without ties is significantly lower than that of TMT members with ties 
(p=1%). This provides support for Conjecture 1. Finally, PPS of TMT members with family ties 
is higher than PPS of those with social ties (p=1%).10 
TMT members without ties are also less likely to sit on the board (p=1%) whereas TMT 
members with family ties are more likely to be board members (p=1%) compared to TMT 
members with social ties.11 As to the price discovery process at the time of the IPO, Table 3 does 
not show any significant differences in the price revision between TMT members with ties and 
those without ties as well as between those with family ties and those with social ties. However, 
TMT members without ties are associated with lower IPO performance, i.e. higher underpricing, 
a lower premium, and lower aftermarket long-run performance, than those with ties (p=5% or 
better). Finally, TMT members with family ties are associated with lower IPO performance than 
TMT members with social ties (p=1% or better); this is the case for all five performance 
measures.  
Table 4 reports the results from the 3SLS estimation of equations (1) and (2), adjusting for the 
possible endogeneity of PPS. Regression (1) is based on equation (1), the PPS equation, whereas 
regressions (2) to (4c) are based on equation (2). As the average TMT size is 7 (see Table 2) we 
have repeat observations for each IPO firm, which are clearly not independent of each other, and 
                                                          
10
 If stock ownership is omitted from PPS, TMT members with social ties have significantly higher PPS than those 
with family ties (p=10%). 
11
 Although not shown in Table 3, TMT members without ties are less likely to have a PhD (p=5%), have shorter 
tenure (p=1%), are less likely to be CEOs (p=1%), and more likely to be a finance, marketing, engineering, R&D, 
and/ or human resources officer (p=10% or better). Moreover, TMT members with family ties are more likely to be 
female (p=10%), have longer tenure (p=1%), are more likely to be the CEO (p=1%), and are also less likely to be 
finance officers, engineering officers, research and development (R&D) officers, and division general managers 
(p=10% or better) than TMT members with social ties. 
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hence the regressions include firm fixed effects. In line with Conjecture 1, regression (1) 
suggests that PPS increases with the TMT member’s family ties and social ties with the board of 
directors. A Wald test (not tabulated) shows that the two coefficients are significantly different 
from each other (p=1%). We also find that PPS is higher for TMT members who have board 
membership (the instrumental variable). PPS is also higher for those TMT members who work 
for smaller firms. In line with Yermack (1996), TMT members of firms with a loss carry-forward 
and lower leverage have greater PPS. PPS also decreases with social board independence. The 
latter two results confirm our expectations that leverage and social board independence act as 
substitutes for PPS. Contrary to our expectations, TMT members of VC-backed firms have 
greater PPS. 
[Table 4 About Here] 
As per Conjecture 1, regression (1) suggests that PPS is higher for TMT members with family 
ties or social ties as compared to TMT members without any such ties.12 We also find that PPS is 
higher for TMT members who have board membership (the instrumental variable). PPS is also 
higher for those TMT members who work for smaller firms. In line with Yermack (1996), TMT 
members of firms with a loss carry-forward and lower leverage have greater PPS. PPS also 
decreases with social board independence. The latter two results confirm our expectations that 
leverage and social board independence act as substitutes for PPS. Contrary to our expectations, 
TMT members of VC-backed firms have greater PPS. 
Further, all five regressions (2) to (4c) show evidence of a positive association between IPO 
performance and PPS, which is consistent with Conjecture 2. In line with prior research by the 
                                                          
12
 A Wald test (not tabulated) shows that the two coefficients are significantly different from each other (p=1%). 
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authors, regressions (2) to (4c) show that family ties reduce both short-term and long-term IPO 
performance, whereas social ties improve performance. More importantly, the interaction term 
between family ties and PPS as well as that between social ties and PPS is significant (except for 
the interaction effect with family ties in regression (3)) (p=10%) and both improve IPO 
performance. An untabulated Wald test indicates no significant difference in the effects on IPO 
underpricing of the interaction term between PPS and social ties and that between PPS and 
family ties. However, the positive effect on the IPO premium is only significant in the case of the 
interaction term between PPS and social ties. Moreover, the positive effect of the former 
interaction on BHAR 1Y, BHAR 2Y, and BHAR 3Y is significantly higher than that between PPS 
and family ties (p=1%). In line with Conjectures 3 and 4, this suggests that PPS reduces the 
negative effect of family ties whereas it strengthens the positive effect of social ties on IPO 
performance. As to the economic effect of PPS, based on average PPS for TMT members with 
family ties (0.175 in Table 3) and the average family ties (0.379 in Table 3), the effect of family 
ties on IPO underpricing is reduced from 0.172 to 0.072, i.e. a 58% reduction. The positive effect 
of PPS on performance is even more pronounced when the latter is measured by the two-year 
BHAR (BHAR 2Y), with a decrease of -0.209 to -0.059, i.e. a 72% decrease. 
As to the control variables, the results from the underpricing regression, i.e. regression (2), are 
consistent with the literature. Underpricing is positively related to price revision, aftermarket 
standard deviation, price-to-book ratio, underwriter reputation, and the market return prior to the 
IPO date (p=5% or better), and it is negatively related to firm size, pre-IPO leverage, and social 
board independence (p=10% or better). Underpricing is also higher in hi-tech firms, and VC-
backed IPOs (p=1% for both). 
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The IPO premium (see regression (3)) is positively related to firm size, aftermarket standard 
deviation, social board independence, and pre-IPO market return (p=10% or better), and it is 
negatively related to underwriter reputation (p=1%). The premium is also higher for hi-tech IPOs 
(p=1%), those with tax loss carry-forwards (p=5%), but is lower in VC-backed IPOs (p=5%). 
Long-run performance over the one-year period, the two-year period and the three-year period 
following the IPO is positively related to firm size, lock-up period (only in regression (4b)), and 
social board independence (p=1%, except in regression (4c)) whereas it is negatively related to 
tax loss carry-forwards (p=5% or better). BHAR 1Y is lower if the IPO is underwritten by a more 
reputable underwriter (p=5%) and BHAR 1Y, BHAR 2Y and BHAR 3Y are lower if the firm has 
high leverage (p=10% or better).  
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
This section carries out a battery of robustness tests. These tests adjust for the potential 
endogeneity of PPS in an alternative way; they allow for the potential endogeneity of family ties, 
and social ties; they check the validity of the assumption that, for TMT members that have both 
family ties and social with a given board member, the former dominate; they allow for industry 
cluster effects; and they check the robustness of the existing results via the estimation of 3SLS 
regressions at the CEO level. There is the possibility that in what precedes we may have drawn 
the wrong inferences as we may not have correctly adjusted for the endogeneity of PPS. 
Similarly, our results may be biased given that we have not allowed for the endogeneity of 
family ties and social ties. Hence, our inferences as to the validity of Conjectures 3 and 4 may be 
wrong. 
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The Potential Endogeneity of PPS and Ties 
In this section, we first test the robustness of our results by adjusting for the potential 
endogeneity of PPS in a different way from what was done above. We do so by first regressing 
PPS on social ties and family ties and then using the residuals from this regression as a proxy for 
PPS in the IPO performance regressions. PPS is thus no longer contaminated by the impact of 
social ties and family ties. Our results about the positive effect of social ties and the negative 
effect of family ties on IPO performance remain consistent and become even slightly more 
significant.13 More importantly, our empirical tests show that the negative effect of family ties is 
mitigated by PPS whereas the positive effect of social ties is amplified by PPS, which is 
consistent with Conjectures 3 and 4. 
Social ties and family ties may also be endogenous. In particular, the positive (negative) effect of 
social (family) ties on firm performance may reflect the endogeneity of these ties, relative to firm 
performance. For example, it may be the case that more capable managers with larger social 
networks, who run well-performing firms, attract closely tied board members. Although the 
Hausman (1978) test does not suggest that family ties and social ties are endogenous, we 
nevertheless test the robustness of our results by testing for the potential endogeneity of social 
ties and family ties in the following two ways. 
First, we estimate 3SLS models with four equations (rather than just two) explaining family ties 
and social ties,14 in addition to PPS and firm performance. Our results, which are not tabulated, 
                                                          
13
 These results are available upon request. 
14
 The explanatory variables in the equations for family ties and social ties are gender, age, tenure and a PhD 
dummy. 
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are qualitatively similar.15 This suggests that, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity 
of ties, the effects of PPS, and TMT ties as well as their interactions on IPO performance remain 
consistent.  
Second, we also conduct a more involved test of dealing with the possible endogeneity of ties, 
focusing on possible differences in the drivers behind social ties and family ties. This test 
consists of matching TMT members with social ties with TMT members with family ties based 
on similar PPS (+/-10%), board membership, gender, pre-IPO ownership (+/-25%), and CEO 
status. In other words, we compare TMT members with social ties with TMT members with 
family ties that are as similar as possible in terms of their characteristics. We are able to match 
110 TMT members with social ties with TMT members with family ties. Table 5 reports the 
results of this additional test. Panel A reports descriptive statistics. Compared to TMT members 
with family ties, TMT members with social ties come hand in hand with greater IPO 
performance, as measured by the IPO premium (p=10%), and BHAR 1Y, BHAR 2Y and BHAR 
3Y (p=1%). Panel B reports the regressions for equation (1) and equation (2). Regression (5) on 
PPS shows that family ties as well as social ties still increase PPS. Further, regressions (6) to (8c) 
suggest that family ties still reduce IPO performance whereas social ties increase IPO 
performance (p=10% or better). This is the case for all five measures of IPO performance. The 
interactive effect between family ties and PPS and the equivalent interactive effect for social ties 
are significant (p=10% or better) in all five regressions (except for the former in regression (7)) 
providing further support for Conjectures 3 and 4. 
[Table 5 About Here] 
                                                          
15
 The results are available upon request. 
27 
 
Although not tabulated, we also perform a less stringent matching consisting of matching TMT 
members with social ties with TMT members with family ties based on similar PPS (+/-50%), 
board membership, gender, pre-IPO ownership (+/-50%), and CEO status. This less stringent 
matching enables us to match 169 TMT members with social ties with an equivalent number of 
TMT members with family ties. We find virtually the same results as for the previous, more 
stringent matching. In particular and in line with Conjecture 1, family ties as well as social ties 
still increase PPS. Finally, in line with our empirical results in Table 4, we find evidence 
consistent with Conjectures 3 and 4. Specifically, although family ties are negatively associated 
with IPO performance, the effect is mitigated by greater PPS (at the 10% level or better). 
Moreover, IPO performance is positively related to social ties and the effect is higher in firms 
with greater PPS (at the 5% level or better). 16  
Third, we use a two-step Heckman procedure in Table 6. The first-step regression (regression 
(9)) estimates the likelihood of a TMT member having social ties with the board members. We 
focus on social ties as family ties are relatively rare (see Table 3); family ties are omitted 
altogether from the Heckman procedure. The second-step regressions, i.e. regressions (10) to 
(12c), are based on equation (2), i.e. the performance equation. There is further support for 
Conjecture 2 of a positive effect of PPS on IPO performance as the coefficient on PPS is 
significant (p=10% or better) in all five performance regressions (regressions (10) to (12c). We 
also still find that the interaction term between PPS and social ties is positive and significant 
(p=10% or better), except in regression (12) on BHAR 3Y. This provides further support for 
Conjecture 4. 
                                                          
16
 The results are not reported in tabular form, but are available upon request from the authors. 
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[Table 6 About Here] 
The above three tests suggest that our main results that PPS improves IPO performance and that 
PPS reduces the negative effect of family ties on IPO performance whereas it increases the 
positive effect of social ties are robust to different ways of adjusting for the potential 
endogeneity of ties.  
The Dominance of Family Ties over Social Ties  
So far, we have assumed that family ties are stronger than social ties. In other words, if a TMT 
member has both family ties and social ties with a given board member, we have considered this 
TMT member to have family ties only with that board member. Whereas in what precedes we 
have argued that family relationships are typically the stronger of the two types of ties, one may 
argue the converse in the IPO context. Indeed, prior research suggests that TMT members with 
family ties are likely to be inward looking and likely to share information with each other only, 
thus providing less instrumental and more redundant resources than TMT members with social 
ties who usually provide diverse expertise (Wellman and Wortley, 1990). Social ties may thus be 
the stronger type of tie in the IPO environment. In particular, social ties may have a stronger 
effect on PPS and IPO performance than family ties.  
As a robustness test, we run a 3SLS system using three types of ties rather than just two. Rather 
than assuming that family ties are stronger than social ties and classing TMT members with both 
types of ties as TMT members with family ties only we now distinguish TMT members with 
both types of ties from those with family ties only, those with social ties only, and those with 
neither type of ties. The results (which are not tabulated) confirm our existing findings.  
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Industry Cluster Effect  
We also verify whether family ties and social ties are clustered in specific industries. Using the 
Fama-French industry classification,17 we run a multinomial Logit regression to explain the 
likelihood of each of the two types of ties across different industries. The regression has little 
explanatory power as evidenced by the pseudo R-square of only 0.0098. The results (which are 
not tabulated) do not suggest that one type of ties or both are more likely in certain industries.18  
Social Ties, PPS, and IPO Performance at the Firm Level and at the CEO Level 
We rerun the regressions from Table 4 at the IPO firm level by aggregating the social ties and 
family ties of individual TMT members. The regressions, which are not tabulated, confirm our 
previous results. We also re-estimate the regressions from Table 4 based on the observations for 
the CEOs only. This enables us to use a more complete measure of PPS, which includes bonuses 
and other one-off cash payments. While bonuses, other one-off cash payments and fixed salary 
are disclosed for the case of the CEO, this information is typically not available for the other 
TMT members. Hence, the CEO level regressions also include the fixed salary of the CEO (as a 
percentage of total assets) as a separate control variable while the bonus is added to PPS. We use 
CEO characteristics, i.e. Female dummy, Age, PhD dummy, and Tenure, as instrumental 
variables in a 3SLS system. The validity of these instruments is discussed in the Appendix. Table 
7 reports the results, and they are consistent with those observed in Table 4.  
[Table 7 About Here] 
                                                          
17
 We use the Fama and French industry classification that is based on the following 10 industries: Consumer Non 
Durables, Consumer Durables, Manufacturing, Energy, Hi-tech Business Equipment, Telecom, Retail, Healthcare, 
Utilities, and Others including Mines and Construction. See 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html for more details.  
18
 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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In particular, we confirm the existence of a positive effect of family ties and social ties on PPS 
(p=10%). We also confirm our previous results that PPS reduces the negative effect of family 
ties on IPO performance and strengthens the positive effect of social ties. The relevant 
interaction terms are significant in all of the regressions (p=10% or better), except for family ties 
in regressions (15) and (16c). All in all, the regression results corroborate our results at the TMT 
member level and suggest that IPO firms are inherently different from mature firms (see Hwang 
and Kim, 2009).19  
CONCLUSION 
Organization theorists acknowledge the importance of the IPO milestone as the “re-birth” of the 
organization (see e.g. Finkle, 1998). The IPO is a crucial event in the life-cycle of the firm as it 
moves from a relatively unknown private company to a public company, seeking capital from a 
large pool of potential investors to finance its expansion (Certo et al., 2009). Corporate 
governance scholars are increasingly recognizing the complexity of this IPO event and the role 
played by effective governance mechanisms in helping IPO firms align the interests of the 
managers with those of the shareholders (Bruton et al., 2010). This study explores the link 
between two corporate governance mechanisms, namely pay-for-performance schemes and 
board independence, and their effect on IPO performance. Specifically, we investigate the link 
between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) for the top management team (TMT) and family ties 
or social ties between TMT members and board members at the IPO.  
                                                          
19
 Since our choice of instruments may be subject to criticism, we also run OLS regressions at the IPO level. The 
OLS results are consistent with the findings in Table 8. These results are available upon request. 
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While board members are expected to support the organization via their advice, external 
networking, and monitoring (Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989), the personal ties 
they have with the top management may impede board effectiveness. Indeed, board members 
with personal ties may have a lax attitude towards monitoring the managers with whom they 
have ties (Fredrickson, Hambrick, and Baumrin, 1988). The effectiveness of the board of 
directors might thus be compromised by the lack of independence. In contrast, one may argue 
that social ties and family ties reduce frictions between the TMT and the board of directors, 
making the latter’s role easier and increasing the likelihood that the former seeks advice from the 
latter (see e.g. Westphal, 1999). Further, any negative effects of ties might be reduced when 
managers are incentivized by adequate compensation packages, reflected by greater PPS, 
whereas any positive effects may be amplified.    
We contribute to the literature by differentiating between social ties and family ties at the time of 
the IPO, a time when such ties are likely to have a particularly high impact, and by examining 
their effects on both PPS and IPO performance. Our study reveals that both PPS and board 
independence have a significant effect on both short-term and long-term IPO performance. In 
line with previous work by the authors (see Chahine and Goergen, 2013), we find a significantly 
different impact of social ties and family ties on IPO performance. More importantly, we find 
that PPS reduces the negative effect of family ties on IPO performance whereas it increases the 
positive effect of social ties. 
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Table 1 – Data Representativeness 
Panel A compares the distribution across time of the IPO sample with that of the IPO population. Panel B performs 
the equivalent comparison across industry sectors, and Panel C compares the key IPO characteristics as well as 
underpricing for the sample with those for the entire IPO population. Market Capitalization is calculated in million 
of USD at the offer price. In line with Loughran and Ritter (2004), hi-tech stocks are defined as those with SIC 
codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware), 3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 (electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 
(measuring and controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment), 4899 
(communications services), and 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379 (software). VC dummy is equal to one if 
the IPO firm is VC-backed, and zero otherwise. Underpricing is equal to the difference between the price at the end 
of the first day of trading and the offer price over the latter. It is calculated for the sample as well as the population, 
i.e. all the IPOs for which data is available in SDC Platinum (i.e. 1,822 IPOs). Due to the presence of outliers for 
underpricing, we winsorize the available data for the population at the 1st and the 99th percentile. Tests for difference 
in proportions are included in Panels A and B, and t-tests for differences in means are included in Panel C.  
Panel A – Number and Percentage of IPOs per Year 
                Sample         Population               Test for Diff.  
Year Number % Number % in Probs.  
1997 169 33.80 429 20.61 0.000 
1998 48 9.60 237 11.38 0.214 
1999 87 17.40 408 19.60 0.006 
2000 89 17.80 318 15.27 0.002 
2001 6 1.20 54 2.59 0.051 
2002 7 1.40 53 2.55 0.127 
2003 8 1.60 51 2.45 0.232 
2004 13 2.60 138 6.63 0.004 
2005 21 4.20 122 5.86 0.126 
2006 15 3.00 120 5.76 0.043 
2007 33 6.60 133 6.39 0.769 
2008 4 0.80 19 0.91 0.606   
Total 500 100.00 2082 100.00    
       
Panel B – Number and Percentage of IPOs per Industry 
                Sample         Population               Test for Diff.  
Industry Classification Number % Number % in Probs.  
Consumer Products and Services 55 11.00 241 11.58 0.717 
Consumer Staples 13 2.60 62 2.98 0.652 
Energy and Power 17 3.40 102 4.90 0.151 
Healthcare 91 18.20 345 16.57 0.383 
Software & IT Consulting Services 183 36.60 737 35.40 0.615 
Industrials 38 7.60 158 7.59 0.993 
Materials 15 3.00 62 2.98 0.979 
Media and Entertainment 19 3.80 100 4.80 0.337 
Retail 24 4.80 122 5.86 0.357 
Telecommunications 45 9.00 150 7.20 0.173 
Transportation 0 0.00 3 0.14 0.396   
          
Panel C – Firm Characteristics and IPO Underpricing        
 Mean        S.d. Mean              S.d.            Test for Diff. 
                       in Means  
Market Capitalization   511.536         920.344           572.081     2552.477    0.602  
Hi-tech IPOs    0.364         0.482           0.373     0.484  0.717  
VC dummy    0.620         0.486           0.597     0.491  0.336 
Underpricing 0.291             0.513 0.363             0.536     0.349  
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics for the IPO Firms 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 500 IPOs from 1997 to 2008. Market 
Capitalization is based on the offer price. Hi-tech dummy is equal to one if the IPO is a hi-tech firm, and zero 
otherwise (see also notes to Table 1). Aftermarket Standard Deviation is equal to the standard deviation of stock 
returns over the 100-day window starting with the trading day following the IPO date. Pre-IPO Leverage is equal to 
pre-IPO long-term debt as a fraction of pre-IPO total assets, both measured in the year preceding the IPO date. 
Price-to-Book Ratio is equal to the offer price over the book value per share at IPO. Lock-up Period is equal to the 
difference in days between the IPO date and the lock-up expiry date. VC dummy is equal to one if the IPO firm is 
VC-backed, and zero otherwise. Social Board Independence is the proportion of outside directors who do not have 
any financial, family, and social ties with one of the TMT members and with the IPO firm. Underwriter Reputation 
is calculated based on the ranking of Loughran and Ritter (2004). Market Return is the compound daily return of the 
equally-weighted CRSP index over the 20 trading days preceding the day of the offer. Price Revision is equal to the 
ratio of the difference between the offer price and the mid-point of the price range over the latter. Underpricing is 
equal to the ratio of the difference between the closing price at the end of the first day of trading and the offer price 
over the offer price. IPO Premium is equal to the difference between the offer price and the book value per share at 
IPO, expressed as a fraction of the offer price. The long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns are calculated using the 
equally-weighted return of (5x5) benchmark portfolios formed based on market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratio. It is calculated based on the 12 months (BHAR 1Y), the 24 months (BHAR 2Y) and the 36 months (BHAR 3Y) 
following the closing price of the first day of trading after the IPO. Data required for calculating BHAR 2Y (BHAR 
3Y) is available for 493 (456) of the 500 sample firms. TMT Size is the total number of executives as listed in the 
prospectus of each IPO firm.  
 
 Variable        Mean        Median s.d.    Min         Q1           Q3            Max  
Firm and Market Characteristics         
Market Capitalization 455.42 236.94 927.54 9.073 98.52 472.96 11139.09 
Aftermarket Standard Deviation 0.023 0.019 0.015 0.000 0.012 0.030 0.107 
Pre-IPO Leverage 0.256 0.120 0.439 0.000 0.000 0.372 6.184 
Price-to-Book ratio 2.695 1.904 3.298 0.358 1.409 2.807 42.692 
Lock-up Period 160.19 180.00 113.86 0.000 180.00 180.00 1080.00 
Social Board Independence 0.285 0.286 0.202 0.000 0.143 0.400 1.000 
Hi-tech dummy 0.364 0.000 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
VC dummy 0.620 1.000 0.486 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Market Return 0.014 0.018 0.041 -0.128 -0.014 0.042 0.145 
Underwriter Reputation 7.345 8.100 2.278 0.000 7.100 9.100 9.100 
         
IPO Price Discovery and Performance         
Price Revision 0.036 0.000 0.248 -0.500 -0.119 0.143 1.000 
Underpricing 0.291 0.125 0.513 -0.709 0.008 0.320 3.373 
Premium 0.734 0.750 0.168 0.040 0.644 0.845 1.778 
BHAR 1Y -0.024 -0.058 0.563 -1.184 -0.453 0.341 2.264 
BHAR 2Y -0.142 -0.160 0.735 -1.682 -0.686 0.331 5.364 
BHAR 3Y -0.059 -0.186 0.498 -1.113 -0.364 0.183 2.489 
 
TMT Members 
TMT Size 7.236 7.000 2.948 1.000 5.000 9.000 22.000  
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Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics for TMT Members 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of TMT members with family and social ties with board members and the sub-sample of TMT 
members without such ties. Family Ties is the proportion of board members with whom a TMT member has a family link, and Social Ties is the proportion of 
board members with whom a TMT member has Origin (i.e. nationality), School (i.e. educational institution), Former Employer Ties, and/ or Club Membership 
Ties. TMT Members with Stock Options is a dummy variable that equals one if the TMT member has stock options at the time of the IPO, and zero otherwise. No. 
of Stock Options is equal to the total number of stock options (in ‘000s) held by the TMT member at the time of the IPO. Stock Options Value is calculated using 
the Black-Scholes model and is in million USD. It is equal to the difference between the theoretically calculated value and the exercise price of the stock options. 
TMT Members with Stock Ownership is a dummy variable that equals one if the TMT member has stock ownership immediately after the IPO, and zero 
otherwise. Post-IPO Ownership is the number of shares held by the TMT member as a proportion of the total number of shares outstanding, both measured 
immediately after the IPO. Value Stock Ownership (in $ mill.) is the TMT member’s stock ownership at the offer price. Pay-Performance Sensitivity (x100) is 
calculated based on the Black-Scholes model and is equal to delta x (shares represented by option award/ shares outstanding following the IPO date), where delta 
is the first derivative of the Black-Scholes option value (i.e. the change in the Black-Scholes option value over the change in the stock price). We then add to that 
figure the number of shares owned by the TMT member divided by the total number of shares outstanding, both being measured immediately following the IPO. 
The PPS values are multiplied by 100 to better show the level of the sensitivity of TMT pay to $100 of performance. Board Member dummy is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the TMT member holds a board seat, and zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 2. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided test for difference in means/proportions), respectively. 
 
                                                                                        TMT Members              
      Without ties              With Ties                      Ties vs.           Family Ties                 Social Ties                     Family Ties  
        (N =2124)              (N= 1489)          No Ties                   (N=169)                   (N=1320)        vs. Social Ties  
(Per TMT Member) Mean        S.d.                Mean      S.d.         Prob. T-test Mean        S.d.        Mean       S.d.         Prob. T-test  
Ties           
Family ties   0.033 0.110  0.379 0.184   
Social Ties   0.221 0.175    0.251 0.165   
 
Stock Options and Stock Ownership             
TMT Members with Stock Options 0.347 0.476 0.572 0.495 0.000*** 0.509 0.501 0.580 0.494 0.077* 
No. of Stock Options (in ‘000s) 68.668 193.695 181.432 424.421 0.000*** 97.165 197.078 192.220 444.117 0.006*** 
Stock Options Value (in $ mill.) 0.824 3.700 2.109 6.230 0.000*** 0.967 2.545 2.255 6.540 0.011** 
 
TMT Members with Stock Ownership 0.494 0.500 0.674 0.469 0.000*** 0.886 0.319 0.646 0.478 0.000*** 
Post-IPO Ownership 0.020 0.068 0.052 0.124 0.000*** 0.169 0.204 0.037 0.100 0.000*** 
Value Stock Ownership (in $ mil)  6.280 46.549 24.545 121.907 0.000*** 70.469 201.041 18.368 105.505 0.000*** 
 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (x100) 2.392 6.944 5.876 12.731 0.000*** 17.450 20.594 4.319 10.330 0.010*** 
 
TMT Characteristics             
Board Member dummy 0.177 0.382 0.430 0.495 0.000*** 0.751 0.433 0.389 0.488 0.000*** 
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IPO Price Discovery and Performance         
Price Revision 0.050 0.251 0.046 0.262 0.582 0.044 0.223 0.046 0.267 0.919  
Underpricing 0.380 0.573 0.310 0.552 0.000*** 0.447 0.699 0.292 0.528 0.001*** 
Premium 0.725 0.162 0.747 0.175 0.000*** 0.714 0.167 0.751 0.176 0.010*** 
BHAR 1Y -0.064 0.542 0.004 0.576 0.000*** -0.224 0.460 0.033 0.583 0.000*** 
BHAR 2Y -0.193 0.656 -0.142 0.709 0.026** -0.459 0.618 -0.101 0.710 0.000*** 
BHAR 3Y -0.104 0.446 -0.023 0.489 0.000*** -0.157 0.468 -0.005 0.489 0.000*** 
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Table 4 – TMT Member Ties, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and IPO Performance 
 
The table presents the 3-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions of pay-performance sensitivity of all stock options 
held by the TMT member and the IPO performance for the sample of 3,613 TMT members. All the regressions are 
estimated using 3SLS, controlling for the endogenous choice of the pay-performance sensitivity. Firm fixed effects 
are included to cluster the errors by IPO firms. All variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denotes significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided t-test), respectively. 
 
       Pay-Performance      Underpricing  Premium         BHAR 1Y        BHAR 2Y       BHAR 3Y  
      Sensitivity 
    (1)          (2)                     (3)                  (4a)       (4b)             (4c)  
Constant 0.036 0.489*** 0.465*** -0.496*** -0.543*** -0.505*** 
 0.023 0.089 0.042 0.120 0.157 0.098 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (PPS)  -0.490** 0.055* 0.426* 0.732** 0.301* 
  0.251 0.094 0.231 0.325 0.163 
Family Ties 0.251*** 0.453*** -0.051* -0.472*** -0.552** -0.125* 
 0.021 0.123 0.031 0.170 0.222 0.068 
Family Ties x PPS  -0.208* 0.119 0.206* 0.345** -1.199* 
  0.116 0.101 0.116 0.160 0.825 
Social Ties 0.044*** -0.117** 0.067*** 0.198*** 0.286*** 0.209*** 
 0.010 0.050 0.019 0.070 0.091 0.056 
Social Ties x PPS  -0.291* 0.374* 1.071* 1.386* 0.533* 
  0.677 0.211 0.623 0.816 0.321 
Price Revision  0.771***     
  0.031      
Ln Size -0.007*** -0.078*** 0.053*** 0.115*** 0.097*** 0.057*** 
 0.001 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.008 
Hi-tech dummy 0.002 0.126*** 0.041*** 0.036* 0.052* 0.037 
 0.003 0.016 0.006 0.022 0.037 0.028 
Aftermarket Standard Deviation 0.184 3.426*** 1.100*** 2.306** 2.828** 1.602** 
 0.014 0.678 0.250 0.929 1.215 0.763 
Loss Carry-forward 0.007** -0.003 0.016** -0.097*** -0.130*** -0.045** 
 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.023 0.030 0.019 
Pre-IPO Leverage -0.005* -0.018* -0.001 -0.035* -0.095*** -0.076*** 
 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.020 0.028 0.018 
Lock-up Period  -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Social Board Independence -0.027*** -0.080** 0.033** 0.297*** 0.434*** 0.036 
 0.008 0.037 0.014 0.052 0.068 0.043 
Price-to-Book ratio 0.001* 0.017***  -0.007** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
 0.000 0.002  0.003 0.004 0.005 
VC dummy -0.007** 0.088*** -0.014** 0.067*** 0.002 0.020 
 0.004 0.017 0.006 0.024 0.031 0.005 
Underwriter Reputation  0.012** -0.005*** -0.015** 0.001 0.007 
  0.005 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.005 
Market Return  0.766*** 0.078* 0.044 -0.174 -0.057 
  0.169 0.045 0.232 0.305 0.197 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.417 0.184 0.102 0.093 0.101 
Chi2 1219.050 2629.540 813.970 358.980 338.340 376.1 
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of Observations 3613 3613 3613 3613 3560 3236  
 
 
43 
 
Table 5 – TMT Members with Social Ties Matched with TMT Members with Family Ties with 
Similar Characteristics 
 
This table presents the 3SLS regressions of the total pay-performance sensitivity and the IPO performance for the 
sub-sample of TMT members with social ties matched with equivalent TMT members with family ties. The 110 
TMT members with social ties are matched with TMT members with family ties based on similar PPS (+/-10%), 
board membership, gender, pre-IPO ownership (+/-25%), and CEO status. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics 
and Panel B contains the regression analysis. All variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided t-test), respectively. 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
 
TMT               Underpricing    Premium BHAR 1Y         BHAR 2Y      BHAR 3Y  
TMT members with Social Ties Mean 0.274 0.753 0.051 0.008 0.015 
(N = 110)                                         Median 0.094 0.778 -0.001 -0.036 -0.098 
                                                         S.d. 0.565 0.155 0.536 0.766 0.455  
 
TMT members  with Family Ties   Mean 0.388 0.715 -0.199 -0.319 -0.179 
(N = 110)                                         Median 0.230 0.754 -0.226 -0.377 -0.236 
                                                         S.d. 0.562 0.161 0.478 0.550 0.437  
T-test for difference 0.137 0.071* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002***  
 
 
Panel B – Regression Analysis (3SLS) 
              Pay-Performance   Underpricing   Premium     BHAR 1Y      BHAR 2Y   BHAR 3Y   
       Sensitivity 
            (5)                    (6)             (7)    (8a)                (8b)      (8c)   
Constant -0.118 0.519 0.386*** -0.453 -1.104* -0.163  
 0.146 0.447 0.149 0.584 0.647 0.393  
Pay-Performance Sensitivity  -0.291* -0.145 0.359* 0.344* 0.140  
  0.157 1.130 0.201 0.192 0.131  
Family Ties 0.174** 0.352** -0.140** -0.550* -0.303** -0.265** 
 0.070 0.158 0.060 0.331 0.141 0.118  
Family Ties x PPS  -0.125* 0.212 0.118* 0.112* 0.135* 
  0.068 0.189 0.063 0.057 0.076  
Social Ties 0.220** -0.250*** 0.040* 0.287** 0.246** 0.186* 
 0.087 0.086 0.024 0.130 0.114 0.101  
Social Ties x PPS  -0.122* 0.015* 0.154** 0.146* 0.081* 
  0.067 0.009 0.077 0.081 0.047  
Board member dummy 0.168***       
 0.026        
Price Revision  1.133***       
  0.208       
Ln Size -0.014* -0.105*** 0.057*** 0.067** 0.051* 0.057*  
 0.008 0.040 0.013 0.032 0.029 0.034  
Hi-tech dummy -0.011 0.088* 0.057** -0.055 0.038 0.097  
 0.026 0.049 0.025 0.131 0.147 0.082 
Aftermarket Standard Deviation -0.639 2.727* 0.927 6.670* 8.623** 8.753*** 
 1.024 1.515 1.102 3.699 3.752 2.828  
Loss Carry-forward -0.050* 0.165 0.030 -0.235* -0.274 -0.232  
 0.026 0.190 0.057 0.124 0.300 0.236  
Pre-IPO Leverage 0.011 -0.009 0.015 0.023 -0.258** 0.227* 
 0.045 0.171 0.056 0.230 0.130 0.137  
Lock-up Period  -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
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Social Board Independence 0.073* -0.102* -0.092 0.405** 0.388** 0.390* 
 0.044 0.059 0.080 0.212 0.192 0.211  
Price-to-Book ratio 0.007 0.036*  0.001 0.012 0.030* 
 0.006 0.020  0.030 0.034 0.018  
VC dummy 0.001 0.212** 0.021 -0.010 -0.198* -0.184** 
 0.027 0.104 0.034 0.135 0.112 0.084  
Underwriter Reputation  0.022 -0.011** -0.047** 0.003 0.026 
  0.020 0.006 0.019 0.033 0.021  
Market Return  0.704** 0.165 0.266 -2.673* -2.968** 
  0.317 0.312 1.269 1.516 1.201  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.553 0.296 0.136 0.191 0.182  
Chi2 89.000 289.020 92.280 43.310 53.710 48.100  
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009  
Number of Observations 220 220 220 220 220 201   
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Table 6 – Social Ties vs. PPS and IPO Performance: A Two-Step Heckman Procedure 
 
The table presents the two-step Heckman procedure for the case of social ties for the sample of 3,613 TMT 
members. All the regressions are estimated using a two-step Heckman procedure. The first-step regression 
(regression (9)) estimates the likelihood of the TMT member having social ties with the board members. The 
second-step regressions (regressions (10)-(12c)) are based on equation (2), i.e. the performance equation. Firm fixed 
effects are included, i.e. the errors are clustered by IPO firm. All variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided t-test), respectively. 
 
                       Social Ties    Underpricing     Premium        BHAR 1Y     BHAR 2Y     BHAR 3Y 
               Dummy 
            (9)         (10)  (11)                (12a)            (12b)          (12c)  
Constant -0.807*** 0.412* 0.203*** -0.702** -0.851* -0.451  
 0.299 0.220 0.064 0.331 0.465 0.293  
Pay-Performance Sensitivity  -0.053* 0.057* 0.239* 0.394** 0.212* 
  0.029 0.032 0.141 0.191 0.112  
Social Ties  -0.028** 0.092*** 0.123** 0.212** 0.092* 
  0.013 0.023 0.056 0.094 0.051  
Social Ties x PPS  -0.021** 0.031*** 0.031* 0.064** 0.034 
  0.010 0.010 0.017 0.025 0.021  
TMT Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm and Offering Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Wald Chi2  1031.856 421.363 268.451 254.314 329.413  
Probability   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
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Table 7 – PPS, Family Ties and Social Ties and IPO Performance: A CEO Level Study  
 
This table presents the 3-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions of the CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the IPO 
performance for the sample of 500 IPOs. Pay-Performance Sensitivity measures the one-dollar change in 
compensation, including stock options, stock ownership, and bonus, based on a one-dollar change in the stock price. 
CEO Female dummy is equal to one if the CEO is a female, and zero otherwise. CEO Age is measured in years. 
CEO PhD dummy is equal to one if the CEO has a PhD, MD or JD, and zero otherwise. CEO Tenure is equal to the 
number of years since the CEO has joined the IPO firm. CEO Salary (% Total Assets) is the CEO’s fixed salary 
expressed as a percentage of total assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the IPO date. All variables are 
defined as in Tables 2 and 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italic beneath the 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (for the two-sided t-test), 
respectively. 
 
               Pay-Performance   Underpricing  Premium       BHAR 1Y     BHAR 2Y     BHAR 3Y 
         Sensitivity 
                                                   3SLS              3SLS               3SLS   3SLS 3SLS         3SLS  
           (13)    (14)             (15)            (16a)            (16b)          (16c)  
Constant 0.094 -0.111** 0.439*** -1.818* -2.033*** -0.347** 
 0.081 0.664 0.093 1.016 0.684 0.162  
Pay Performance Sensitivity (PPS) -1.356** 0.310* 3.819** 4.610** 0.425  
  0.677 0.169 1.549 2.052 0.484  
Family Ties  0.374*** 0.494* -0.046* -1.129* -2.154** -0.065* 
 0.070 0.265 0.028 0.606 1.076 0.038  
Family Ties x PPS  -0.157** 0.091 0.656* 0.909* 0.077  
  0.073 0.076 0.355 0.517 0.244  
Social Ties 0.241*** -0.466** 0.065* 0.668*** 0.971** 0.607** 
 0.052 0.213 0.036 0.974 0.433 0.305  
Social Ties x PPS  -0.153** 0.131** 0.247* 0.522* 0.138* 
  0.067 0.058 0.143 0.297 0.077 
Female dummy 0.026        
 0.036        
Age 0.002***       
 0.001        
PhD dummy 0.022**       
 0.010        
CEO Tenure -0.002*      
 0.001        
Salary (% Total Asset) -0.001        
 0.481        
Price Revision  0.783***      
  0.091       
Ln Size -0.026*** -0.106*** 0.038*** 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.059*** 
 0.008 0.024 0.008 0.036 .047 0.011  
Hi-tech dummy -0.010 0.114** 0.044*** 0.005 -0.020 0.075  
 0.017 0.047 0.015 0.071 0.094 0.132  
Aftermarket Standard Deviation 0.067 0.775 0.593 3.117 3.944 2.978*** 
 0.664 2.025 0.627 3.050 4.061 0.954  
Loss Carry-forward -0.063*** 0.119 0.030* 0.123 0.171 -0.020  
 0.017 0.112 0.016 0.171 0.226 0.053  
Pre-IPO Leverage 0.043** -0.100 0.004 -0.150 -0.224 0.034  
 0.017 0.082 0.018 0.126 0.169 0.039  
Lock-up Period  -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000  
Social Board Independence 0.128*** -0.141** 0.013 0.151** 0.321** 0.197** 
 0.040 0.058 0.043 0.066 0.156 0.082  
Price-to-Book ratio 0.004* 0.024***  -0.017 -0.024* -0.027* 
 0.002 0.007  0.010 0.014 0.016  
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VC dummy -0.056*** 0.185* -0.002 0.255* 0.427** 0.027  
 0.018 0.099 0.023 0.151 0.202 0.047  
Underwriter Reputation  0.021 -0.001 0.001 0.018 -0.006  
  0.018 0.005 0.028 0.038 0.009  
Market Return  0.631** 0.110 0.187 -0.023 0.370  
  0.299 0.168 0.696 0.946 0.236  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Adjusted R2 0.305 0.282 0.265 0.154 0.142 0.178  
Chi2 671.150 291.600 178.980 47.170 55.940 55.033  
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Number of Observations 500 500 500 500 492 456    
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APPENDIX – Appropriateness of the instruments in the 3SLS regressions 
PPS may not be exogenous to firm performance. Indeed, while PPS is hypothesized to improve 
IPO performance, PPS as well as IPO performance is also hypothesized to be affected by family 
ties and social ties. Hence, it may be the case that PPS depends on IPO (firm) performance. Put 
differently, the literature on the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance 
(managerial ownership is included in the calculation of PPS) suggests that the former is not 
endogenous (see e.g. Himmelberg et al., 1999). 
There is thus a need to control for the potentially endogenous determination of PPS. We do so by 
using the TMT member’s board membership as an instrumental variable. Board Member dummy 
equals one if the TMT member sits on the board, and is zero otherwise. Prior research suggests 
that managers may use their seat on the board to reduce PPS and to increase their fixed salary 
(Conyon and Peck, 1998; Hwang and Kim, 2009). However for the instrument to be valid, it 
should not affect IPO performance. In support of our choice of instrument, we fail to find 
conclusive evidence of an effect of board membership on IPO performance. Still, one may argue 
that the TMT member’s board membership affects firm performance, and as such it may not be 
an appropriate instrument for PPS. For example, to the extent that the Board Member dummy 
captures executive experience, capability and reputation, this variable is likely to affect firm 
performance. However, this means that all TMT members appointed to the board would help 
their firm increase performance, and there is no evidence of that. 
We also compare our instrument with other potential candidates, i.e. additional TMT member 
characteristics. They include a female dummy, the TMT member's age, a PhD dummy, tenure, a 
CEO dummy, a finance dummy for accounting, finance and treasury managers, a marketing 
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dummy for marketing and sales managers, an engineering dummy for engineering and operations 
managers, an R&D dummy for research and development managers, a division general manager 
dummy, and a human resources dummy for human resources and legal affairs managers, 
respectively. We run an exclusion test for the instruments in an over-identified system, i.e. a 
Sargan test, and the results show the validity of the Board Member dummy as it is the most 
orthogonal instrument with the IPO performance measures. Further, support for our choice of 
instrument is provided by the very low correlation coefficients between the Board Member 
dummy on one side and the various IPO performance measures on the other side. These 
correlation coefficients range from only -0.034 to only 0.003. Finally, the strength and the 
reliability of our instrument are also confirmed by the high R-square and F-test in the relevant 
regressions (see Staiger and Stock, 1997, for a discussion on the appropriateness of 
instruments).20  
Finally, in the CEO-based regressions in Table 8, we use a different set of instruments given that 
all CEOs sit on the board of directors. We use Female dummy, Age, PhD dummy, and Tenure as 
instrumental variables. The latter seem to be appropriate instruments as there is no clear evidence 
of the effects of these variables on IPO performance. In contrast, PPS might be affected by the 
differences in risk-taking attitudes between male and female CEOs; it might also be affected by 
CEO age, and tenure in the firm, as well as by the CEO’s education. The Hausman (1978) 
specification test using the latter four variables confirms the endogeneity of PPS at the 1.93% 
significance level. It also confirms the strength and the reliability of our instruments, mainly 
CEO age, and this is consistent with the high F-test of 15.07. 
                                                          
20
 The R-square is 0.295 and the F-test is 36.3. 
